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Abstract: This paper argues for a new 
inter-pretation of Schopenhauer’s political 
theory in the light of the category of conflict. 
Accor-ding to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, 
The Will (to live), that inhabits any living 
being and always requests Will/life, cannot 
ever grasp itself in the “representational” 
side. This generates struggle, conflict, 
misery and sorrow. This schismatic and 
conflictual schema recurs in his moral, 
social and poli-tical arguments. Coherently 
with his meta-physical view, he 
substantially theorized the socio-political 
issue twofold (“political Ma-nichaeism”). On 
the one hand is the repre-sentational sphere 
- politics as an institu-tional question (the 
regulative function of the State); on the 
other hand, the metaphy-sical or inner 
sphere - conflict (as means) is unavoidable 
and solidarity (as goal) in any human social, 
moral and political agency re-presents the 
one and only irremissible pres-criptive 
principle. 
 
Resumo: Este artigo defende uma nova 
interpretação da teoria política de Schope-
nhauer à luz da categoria de conflito. De a-
cordo com a metafísica de Schopenhauer, o 
conceito de vontade (de vida), que habita 
todo ser vivo e sempre requer vontade e vi-
da, não pode ser captado pelo lado “repre-
sentacional”; isso geraria luta, conflito, mi-
séria e tristeza. Esse esquema cindido e 
conflitante se repete nos temas morais, so-
ciais e políticos do filósofo. Coerente com 
sua visão metafísica, Schopenhauer teori-
zou substancialmente a questão sócio-polí-
tica a partir de uma dupla vertente (mani-
queísmo político). Por um lado, tem-se a es-
fera representacional - política como uma 
questão institucional (a função regulativa 
do Estado). Por outro lado, a esfera metafí-
sica ou interna - em que o conflito (como 
meio) é inevitável e a solidariedade (como 
meta), sob qualquer forma de agir moral, 
político e social, representa o único e irre-
missível princípio moral de tipo prescritivo. 
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1. Schopenhauer and the category of conflict 
 
n the title of my paper I use the terms “metaphysics” and “conflict” as 
the keywords to read Schopenhauer’s Politics. The former is the 
framework to comprehend the various meanings of the latter: conflict, 
contradiction and disagreement are not merely human actions, but the core of 
metaphysical doctrine, which ethics and politics build on. So I will discuss this 
issue in two steps: 1) I will argue for the category of “conflict” in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, then, 2) I will discuss the fundamental dichotomy in Schopenhauer’s 
political theory (political Manichaeism). 
Schopenhauer did not write any systematic treatise on legal-political 
doctrine in a strict sense. He was neither Kant, nor Fichte or Hegel: he did not take 
part in political debates or strongly point out the best policy for humankind. On the 
contrary, he experienced his “Zeitgeist” with a modern epicurean mood: Λά θε 
βιώ σάς (Epicurus), or with the Latin locution Bene vixit qui bene latuit (Ovid). 
Schopenhauer did not recognize himself in a Nation; he felt himself to be a citizen 
of a higher corpus politicus. In a letter sent to the Dean of the University of Jena in 
1812 - after the Napoleonic siege of Berlin - he wrote that he felt like a stranger 
everywhere and all the time: he would not serve humankind by fighting with his 
hands, but by writing and thinking1.   
Schopenhauer’s political disengagement depends primarily on his private 
income: he could quickly and easily move away (around the whole European area) 
when he felt himself  to be in peril or discomfort. This happened, for example, in 
1806 when the Napoleonic troops broke into Weimar and particularly in 1848 
when the revolutionary “sovereign canaille” upset Frankfurt. In a letter sent to 
Julius Frauenstaedt on 11 July 1848, Schopenhauer wrote: “When the storm comes, 
all the sails must be stricken”2. This political disengagement is also theoretically 
meaningful: it depends on Schopenhauer’s “intransigent nominalism”, so Max 
Horkheimer meant his socio-political attitude. In fact, Schopenhauer considered 
the State, Justice, Law, Society and History to be just names or abstractions, 
                                            
1 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Gesammelte Briefe, p. 643. 
2 Idem, p. 231. 
I 
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standing for nothing real or existing3. Only the individual is “real”; this is the reason 
why he upheld this scepticism.       
Nevertheless, he was not uninterested in political and historical events; he 
just literally kept his “distance” from them. From very early on, this was his 
conviction. As he noted in 1814 about society and humankind, it is necessary and 
wise to maintain “a distant behaviour”4: society – he wrote, using a metaphor – is 
like a flame; the wise man gets warm while keeping his distance from it, whereas 
the stupid one complains that the flame burns. So let me get you into the core issue 
of my presentation 
Consideration of Schopenhauer’s political theory must not omit his 
metaphysical doctrine. He solved ethical and political questions through 
metaphysics, as testified in some letters5. In 1813, the young Schopenhauer already 
noted that his philosophy should be regarded as ethics and metaphysics together, 
two disciplines wrongly separated, in the same way that  human beings are 
wrongly divided into body and mind6.  
In the second book of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer 
explains that the metaphysical feature of the whole world is conflictual.  
 
Everywhere in nature – writes Schopenhauer – we see conflict, we 
see struggle, we see victory changing hands; later we will 
recognize this more clearly as the internal rupture that is essential 
to the Will. Each level of Will’s objectification is in conflict with the 
others over matter, space and time7.  
 
The inner nature of Will is an irrational and unitary principle, which 
objectifies itself gradually, and then Schopenhauer hypothesizes a hierarchic order 
for the world structure. Each grade is a platonic Idea, which is an eternal shape that 
occurs in the representation through space, time and causality. At the lowest grade 
of the objectification of Will, there are natural bio-chemical and physical forces; at 
                                            
3 Cf. HORKHEIMER, M. Gesammelte Schriften, p. 43; cf. SCHMIDT, A. Tugend und Weltlauf. 
4 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handscrifltliche Nachlass, FM, p. 113. 
5 Cf. BRINKMANN, K. Die Rechts- und Staatslehre Schopenhauers, p. 10. 
6 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handscrifltliche Nachlass, FM, p. 55. 
7 I quote the original text: “So sehen wir in der Natur überall Streit, Kampf und Wechsel des Sieges, 
und werden eben darin weiterhin die dem Willen wesentliche Entzweiung mit sich selbst 
deutlicher erkennen. Jede Stufe der Objektivation des Willens macht der andern die Materie, den 
Raum, die Zeit streitig” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 27, p. 208 [English translation of The World 
as Will and Representation refers to SCHOPENHAUER, A. 2010]). 
  
The metaphysics of conflict: some reflections on Schopenhauer’s politics 
 
 
143Revista Voluntas: Estudos sobre Schopenhauer-Vol. 7, Nº 1. 1º semestre de 2016. ISSN:2179-3786-pp. 140-154. 
the top, in human beings, there is reason, which is not at all sovereign in nature, but 
simply and always enslaved to Will. Referring to Schopenhauer’s Berlin Lessons, 
Sandro Barbera writes: “L’unite  de la nature se pre sente comme une hie rarchie de 
forces (generals, me caniques, chimiques, oeganiques, morales) qui sont toutes, a  
different niveaux, des objectivations de la volonte ”8.  
The universal forces in nature become real through polarization, divisions 
and oppositions. Kein Sieg ohne Kampf [No victory without a struggle]9: this is 
Schopenhauer’s synthetic motto, dealing with all the conflictual dynamics and the 
continuous and natural struggle, which relates to many grades in the emanation of 
the Will to live.  
 
Since the higher Idea or objectification of the Will - writes 
Schopenhauer – can come forward only by overpowering the 
lower Ideas, it encounters resistance on their part. Even when the 
lower Ideas are quickly brought, they nonetheless keep striving to 
express their essence in a complete and self-sufficient manner10.  
 
Schopenhauer directly deduces from Schelling’s doctrine the polarization in 
nature as the general principle, as the “original phenomenon”, as unity structured 
in polarization: Barbera argues that Schopenhauer  learned from Schelling the 
concept of “powers” in nature, which engage conflict to get a supreme unity11. 
Barbera writes: “Les forces supe rieures sont les «puissances» (dans le sense 
mathe matique du term) de celles infe rieures, et tout la dinamique des forces est 
sostenue par le conflit qui en constitue le moteur et la re fe rence commune”12. 
Again, in the fourth book of his masterpiece, Schopenhauer repeats that in each 
grade of the objectification of Will there is a steady struggle [ein beständiger 
Kampf] among individuals of every species, and this is the expression of an 
“intimate conflict of the Will to live against itself”13.  
                                            
8 BARBERA, S. Une philosophie du conflit, p. 99. 
9 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 27, pp. 203-204. 
10 “Indem die höhere Idee, oder Willensobjektivation, nur durch Überwältigung der niedrigeren 
hervortreten kann, erleidet sie den Widerstand dieser, welche, wenn gleich zur Dienstbarkeit 
gebracht, doch immer noch streben, zur unabhängigen und vollständigen Äußerung ihres Wesens 
zu gelangen” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 27, p. 207). 
11 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftilche Nachlass, FM, § 548; cf. BARBERA, S. Une philosophie 
du conflit, pp. 106-107. 
12 BARBERA, S. Une philosophie du conflit, pp. 101-102. 
13 SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 61, pp. 430-431. 
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In this sense, there cannot be any “struggle for recognition” [Kampf um 
Anerkennung], as pointed out by Axel Honneth14. The conflictual issue does not 
deal in fact with consciousness and its instances, so that we can consider that 
political and multi-layered society derives from “ethical life” [Sittlichkeit]. 
Schopenhauer’s theory of conflict is deeper than the Hegelian scheme of 
contradiction: Schopenhauer’s model involves all living beings and the category of 
conflict explains the way the Will to live arises. It basically concerns a 
“metaphysical grammar” of the conflict, therefore it is possible to argue for the 
moral and socio-political sphere. Barbera argues:  
 
Dans le conflit, qui suppose la présence de forces supérieures et 
de forces «résistantes», toutes les individualités sont manitenues 
et se reconnaissent réciproquement, sur l’example d’une 
dialectique valet (ou esclave)-maître, dans laquelle il est evident 
que le forces se modifient sur la base d’un modèle sociale. 
Schopenhauer parle de «domination» (Überwältigung) et de 
«résistance» (Widerstrand), et ce sont les même termes que 
Nietzsche emploiera pour indiquer le rapport commander-obéir 
qui constitue la structure profonde de la volonté de puissance, 
qu’il entend dans l’aphorisme 19 du Au-delà du bien et du mal et 
dans les fragmentes posthumes de la période comme un «affect du 
commandement»15.  
  
Julius Bahnsen, one of the most original disciples of the “Schopenhauer-
Schule” (Fazio 2009a; 2009b), theorized a conflictual re-elaboration of 
Schopehauer’s metaphysics, Realdialektik. In his work Der Widerpruch im Wissen 
und Wesen der Welt, published in 1880, he used the term and the concept of conflict 
to describe the metaphysical and internal contradiction of the Will, which is to be 
found among individuals and inside the individual16. Bahnsen argued for the “real 
negativity of the Will” and the core of his metaphysics is the self-contradictoriness 
of Will. He sustained that “the antithesis is the whole, whereas the thesis and the 
synthesis don’t stand at all”17. The Realdialektik is the “science of the real 
contradiction”: real is the self-parting of Will into “otherness”, real are the 
individuals and their contradictions. Bahnsen theorized a strong theory of 
                                            
14 Cf. HONNETH, A. The struggle for recognition. 
15 BARBERA, S. Une philosophie du conflit, p. 110. 
16 Cf. BAHNSEN, J. Der Widerpruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt, p. 48; p. 225. 
17 BAHNSEN, J. Das Tragische als Weltgesetz und der Humor als ästhetische Gestalt des 
Metaphysischen, p. 1. 
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contradictory dialectics without any kind of redemption (aesthetic or ethical). 
Schopenhauer on the contrary argued for a way to escape from conflict in nature or 
at least to catch it without suffering.  
The struggle of material shapes in nature [Kampf der Formen um die 
Materie], described by Schopenhauer, is only an epiphenomenal aspect of Will in 
itself: it is the necessary mediation through the representational sphere. This order 
doesn’t represent any plan of a higher entity: there is no teleological plan at all, 
since every part finds its raison d’être inwards, due to the fragmentary character of 
the world and life.  He felt very close to Ho lderlin’s conviction in Hyperion about the 
coming of the spiritual night and the absence of Gods. Schopenhauer reversed the 
Western teleological perspective and theorizes the end of any rational and human 
meaning (τε λος) in history and society. The only finalism he could accept does not 
depend on human categories: so finalism is just the name of what we are able to 
grasp about the realization of Will.  
However, in this hierarchic and complex order in nature, human beings find 
their place at the top: the human species is able to overwhelm the others and to 
submit nature as a whole. Nature is considered, in fact, as a “product at human 
disposal”: this idea, very familiar to Heidegger and Jonas, is the key for 
Schopenhauer to explain that our natural disposition for struggle is reflected inside 
human nature. Human hegemony over the animal, plant and mineral kingdom 
becomes a hegemony over our neighbours: homo homini lupus, as Schopenhauer 
directly refers to Hobbes. The same contention and overwhelming in the lower 
grades of the objectification of Will recurs in human relations18.  
For Schopenhauer, conflict between individuals is the most terrible in 
nature. In his masterpiece Schopenhauer writes: “At the highest level of 
consciousness, which is to say human consciousness, egoism (like cognition, pain 
and joy) must have reached the higher level as well, and the conflict between 
individuals (that it conditions) must be at its most terrible”19. Thus, Egoism is the 
                                            
18 Cf. BARBERA, S. Une philosophie du conflit, pp. 103-104. 
19 “In dem auf den höchsten Grad gesteigerten Bewußtseyn, dem menschlichen, muß die 
Erkenntniß, der Schmerz, die Freude, so auch der Egoismus den höchsten Grad erreicht haben und 
der durch ihn bedingte Widerstreit der Individuen auf das entsetzlichste hervortreten” 
(SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 61, p. 432 [see also SCHOPENHAUER, A. On the basis of morality]). 
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“starting point for all struggle” [Ausgangspunkt alles Kampfes] in human agency20 
and the real “longing to existence and well-being”21, as Schopenhauer affirms in On 
the basis of morality. It is the first fact of moral consciousness: “egoism is colossal, it 
towers above the world” (KS, § 14: 553). Anybody can recognize inwards the inner 
centre of the world (WWII, § 47: 698), but looking outside we feel just like a “drop 
in the sea”. The difference from the other is “absolute” (KS, § 22: 622). So, reason 
builds the State to prevent the consequences of universal egoism, which is then the 
first moral stimulus to fight through the real “cardinal virtue”, that is justice 
[Gerechtigkeit]. In On the basis of morality, Schopenhauer writes: “In war we must 
first recognize the enemy; in the impending struggle, egoism, as the chief force on 
its own side, will be the principal opponent of the virtue of justice, which in my 
opinion is the first and really cardinal virtue”22. 
The justice mentioned above is not providence and it is not related to 
human deeds in the course of history. If we expect to find a trail or a sign of a 
higher plan (rational, divine or simply finalist) in historical events, we’re destined 
to fail. In Parerga und Paralipomena Schopenhauer argues about his philosophy of 
history. In a short and illuminating paragraph (Chapter 12), he says that:  
 
History shows us the life of nations and we cannot find in it 
nothing but wars and outrage [Kriege und Empörungen]; the years 
of peace appear here and there only as short pauses, as intervals 
between the acts. And in the same way, the life of the individual is 
a perpetual struggle, not merely metaphorically with want and 
boredom but actually with others. Everywhere he finds an 
opponent, lives in constant conflict, and dies weapon in hand23.  
 
 This is Schopenhauer’s statement, which he previously noted in 1822 in his 
                                            
20 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 61, p. 431. 
21 “[…] der Drang zum Daseyn und Wohlseyn” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, KS, § 14, p. 
552). 
22 “Inzwischen ist im Kriege das Erste, daß man den Feind rekognoscirt. In dem bevorstehenden 
Kampfe wird der Egoismus, als der Hauptmacht seiner Seite, vorzüglich sich der Tugend der 
Gerechtigkeit entgegengestellen, welche, nach meiner Ansicht, die erste und recht eigentliche 
Kardinaltugend ist” (idem, KS, § 14, p. 555). 
23 “Die Geschichte zeigt uns das Leben der Völker, und findet nichts als Kriege und Empörungen zu 
erzählen: die friedlichen Jahre erscheinen nur als kurze Pausen, Zwischenakte, dann und wann ein 
Mal. Und eben so ist das Leben des Einzelnen ein fortwährender Kampf, nicht etwan bloß 
metaphorisch mit der Noth, oder mit der Langenweile; sondern auch wirklich mit Andern. Er findet 
überall den Widersacher, lebt in beständigem Kämpfe und stirbt, die Waffen in der Hand” 
(SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, PP II, p. 265). 
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Berliner Manuscripts, explicitly citing Voltaire24.   
Human nature reflects the intimate core and essence of the Will to live: we 
learn from history that progress is a useful illusion for human facts, which are 
characterized by blood and wars. According to Schopenhauer, we pay very dearly 
for our welfare. The argument of the “original Sin” in Schopenhauer deals with the 
idea that the joys of humankind are paid for through countless pains and sorrows. 
Justice through injustice; peace through war; good through evil. We should be 
aware of the fact that we are guilty; that is, we are part of a “collective” sin25. The 
inequality in modern society is the product of a struggle between those few who 
use violence or cunning as means to prevail, and those who suffer this condition: 
Schopenhauer explicitly refers to proletarianism, poverty and slavery. “The whole 
unnatural condition of society”, he says, [is] “the universal struggle to escape from 
misery” and he considered the diminishing of luxury, or even the abolishment of it 
altogether as the most effective way to alleviate human misery26.  
 
2. Schopenhauer and the flourishing politics from the metaphysics of Will 
 
The World as Will The World as Representation 
The Political (socio-moral agency through 
conflictual/sympathetic participation) 
The Politics as Polity (the State with regulative 
function) 
Metaphysical perspective Subjective perspective 
Active Sphere/Agency Passive Sphere/patire 
Conflict  Negotiation/Regulation 
Liberty Necessity 
Eternal Justice Temporal Justice 
 
 As the world is the result of an eternal contradiction due to its twofold 
configuration, I suggest we consider Schopenhauer’s political theory by observing 
this metaphysical schema: the representational side (phenomenal, symbolic, 
illusionary) that concerns the world as it appears; and the metaphysical one 
(noumenical, substantial, real) that concerns the world as it is. We can count in fact 
a twofold political discourse in Schopenhauer: I call it “political Manichaeism”. It is 
not intended as a struggle between Good and Evil; rather, it is a metaphor to 
                                            
24 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, BM, § 122. 
25 Cf. HORKHEIMER, M. Gesellschaft im Übergang, pp. 167-168. 
26 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, PP II, § 125, pp. 223-224. 
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identify an irreducible dichotomy between two levels in his political theory. I put 
forward the distinction between politics as representation and politics as will: this 
distinction refers to a widely shared opinion in contemporary political 
philosophy27 about the difference between “politics” and “political”. I refer 
particularly to Lefort’s paradigm and to the distinction between the symbolic and 
normative sphere of the “politics” (la politique) and the essential and trans-
normative one of the “political”(le politique).  
On the one hand, Schopenhauer recognizes that conflict is the core of any 
moral, social and authentic political agency (that is the political); on the other 
hand, he sustains the necessity of a monarchic political body (that is the polity) to 
naturally sedate pluralistic conflict, then to neutralize conflictual instances. In the 
‘40s he proved himself very sceptical about revolutionary and democratic 
movements: looking at the political events in France in 1848, he explicitly felt much 
closer to Napoleon III than to the revolutionary crowd. 
Schopenhauer’s political theory is grounded in moral issues and branches 
out into a philosophy of law and a theory of justice. In his Dresden manuscripts, he 
explicitly wrote that the “concept of the Right is properly moral” and it literally 
means: the property of an individual Will - in its phenomenal appearance - to not 
deny the Will in other bodies28. The individual is damaging when their own 
affirmation is the negation of another “embedded” Will. He considers the Right 
theory as a “moral upside down”. The question deals with “doing of wrong to 
someone” or “suffering of wrong by others”: in other words, to cause and to suffer 
sorrow. Political institutions are born to remedy the second instance, that is, 
protecting individuals from their “suffering of wrong by others”29. This concept is 
remarked on by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation, when he 
sustains that “suffering injustice” [das Unrechtleiden] refers to the “the conflict of 
the Will to live with itself, resulting from the plurality of individuals and egoism”30. 
The origin of the “social contract”, that is the law, deals with renouncing to egoistic 
pleasure in causing injustice. In the Republic of Plato, Schopenhauer finds this first 
                                            
27 Cf. LEFORT, C. Democracy and political Theory; cf. MOUFFE, C. Deliberative democracy and 
agonistic pluralism; cf. MACHART, O. Post-foundational political thought; cf. HABERMAS, J. The 
“political”. 
28 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, FM, § 535. 
29 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, FM, § 567. 
30 SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 62, p. 444. 
  
The metaphysics of conflict: some reflections on Schopenhauer’s politics 
 
 
149Revista Voluntas: Estudos sobre Schopenhauer-Vol. 7, Nº 1. 1º semestre de 2016. ISSN:2179-3786-pp. 140-154. 
political postulate, much before Hobbes, Spinoza and Rousseau. “Schopenhauer 
sees the realization of the purpose of the state (the well-being of everyone) only in 
the negative, that is to say as an institute that guarantees protection”31.  
If the first fundamental instance deals with suffering injustice, the second deals 
with committing it: so Schopenhauer argues for a “criminal” code as strategic 
means to deter crime, violence and injustice. It can be realized only inside the State, 
as right to punish [Strafrecht] in a “positive law”32.    
 
The principal aims of the State are: 
a. First of all, protection directed outwards; it deals with 
protection against the natural forces. This is the international 
legitimation of natural law. 
b. Protection directed inwards; that is, protection of the members 
of the State against one another, and consequently the 
safeguarding of private law. But the granting of this twofold 
protection brings about the need for a third. 
c. Protection against the protector, and thus a guarantee of civil 
law. It is necessary to keep the division of power into three, that is, 
legislative, executive and jurisdictional33.    
 
The State (polity) is then a protective institution primarily against the 
“consequences of egoism”, then against the “consequences of other people’s 
egoism”, as Schopenhauer noted in his early manuscripts34.   
The politics is a particular kind of art; that is, managing the original nature 
of our essence: according to Schopenhauer, the authentic state of nature is 
characterized by “force” and “might” [Gewalt]35, then polity substitutes might with 
law through the legitimation in a new employment of it. The primary task of polity 
is to submit and then enslave physical might to intellect. Rationality is then the new 
name of that which governs above disorder and plurality. The most inner 
disposition of human nature is, in fact, the intellect and rationality, the “head” that 
leads our body. It is useful maybe to recall the original cover of Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
where the monarch is represented as the head of a plurality of persons. 
Schopenhauer in Parerga und Paralipomena holds that, because of our 
                                            
31 GODART-VAN DER KROON, A. Schopenhauer's Theory of Justice and its Implication to Natural Law. 
32 SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 62, p. 450. 
33 SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV II, § 47, pp. 691-692.  
34 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, JM, § 535. 
35 “Von Natur herrscht die Gewalt: statt dieser dem Rechte zur Herrschaft zu verhelfen, dies ist das 
Problem der Staatkunst” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, PP II, § 127, p. 227). 
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“intellectual” nature, the best natural polity for humankind should be 
constitutional monarchy. Schopenhauer argues that the people are sovereign, but 
they must be under constant protection because of their minority36. The monarch 
corresponds to our brain, which leads and governs the parts of our body: so he 
affirms, using the Greek language, that the brain is literally ηγεμονικον. According 
to Schopenhauer, the planetary system is “monarchic” too.  
Schopenhauer’s political Manichaeism cannot escape from self-
contradiction: the sphere of polity fills the symbolic space of politics through 
hegemony and might; that is, through the same forces and means it claims to fight 
in a moral sense. Thus, it contains, condemns and neutralizes conflict, which is the 
natural, metaphysical issue in human deeds. This brings us to Laclau’s assertion in 
Emancipation(s): “universal is no more than a particular that at some moment has 
become dominant”37.   
However, for Schopenhauer the State cannot be the condition of liberty in 
the moral sense38 on the contrary to Hegel’s feature. Schopenhauer criticizes Kant’s 
doctrine too, since he derived the institution of the State as moral duty from the 
categorical imperative. As Schopenhauer says: “The State is set up in the correct 
assumption that pure morality (that is, correct conduct on moral grounds), is not to 
be expected; otherwise it would be superfluous”39. “Real” liberty is beyond 
phenomenon and representation, and this holds a fortiori beyond every human 
institution40. 
In the chapter Zur Rechtslehre und Politik of Parerga und Paralipomena, 
Schopenhauer states his negative political model: he argues again that Rights, 
justice and liberty are negative concepts, whereas injustice, on the contrary, is 
positive41. His foundation of morality has a negative connotation too: Naeminem 
laede, imo omnes, quantum potes, iuva. In the third part of On the basis of Morality, 
Schopenhauer explains this idea. We perceive the multiplicity of the world, but we 
should go beyond it, because the “principle of individuation” is theoretically an 
                                            
36 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. PP II, § 126, p. 226. 
37 LACLAU, E. Emancipation(s), p. 26. 
38 Cf. GODART-VAN DER KROON, A. Schopenhauer's Theory of Justice and its Implication to Natural 
Law. 
39 “[Der Staat] errichtet unter der richtigen Voraussetzung, daß reine Moralität, d.h. Rechthandeln 
aus moralischen Gründen, nicht zu erwarten ist; außerdem er selbst ja überflüssig wäre”.  
40 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 62, p. 448. 
41 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, PP II, § 121, p. 219. 
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illusion. There is no real difference between individuals or living beings.  
The paradox is that the real realization of the authentic political in moral 
sense always aims at the extra-politics; that is, overcoming the representational 
side. It is really close to an utopian spirit. The only authentic moral principle that 
can be followed is in fact solidarity, compassion [Mitleid], which is beyond any kind 
of individualism and egoism, then any struggle too. The individual must renounce 
their individuality.  
Schopenhauer considered the core of his theory of Justice as a great 
“mystery”: it deals with the concept of “compassion” [Mitleid]. It is the capacity to 
identify with another’s suffering, with the aim of nullifying it. If the individual is 
able to neutralize the difference from the others, that is, he can go beyond the 
“representational” sphere, he grasps the “basis of any spontaneous and free justice 
and any genuine love for humankind”42. This is the only real basis, which can be 
considered as value of morality. Solidarity is, in fact, as Schopenhauer says, “the 
only source of non-egoistic agency, which has the right to be a moral value”43.  
Compassion is then the moral key to gain access to “eternal Justice”: 
Schopenhauer divided it from “temporal Justice”, which finds a place only within 
the State and “can repay or punish the crime” through human institutions and time. 
Eternal Justice is still beyond them, because it goes beyond the principium 
individuationis: if we look, in fact, into the essence of the World, we are able to bear 
any suffering, injustice, abuse and offence, because we feel that they are moved 
against our own44. He who elevates above space, time and causality is able to grasp 
that the tormenter and the tormented are one. The theory of justice in 
Schopenhauer turns into mysticism. He finds in fact in the Upanishad precept of 
“Tat twam asi” (“You are that”) the ethical and legal solution for egoism and 
individualism.  
In conclusion, the only way to overcome the dichotomy between conflict and 
identification with others is to accept it. It is irreducible. The aim of good for the 
community might be realized only in this conflictual dialectics in the 
representational sphere. On the one hand, conflict, struggle, competition and 
                                            
42 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, KS, § 17, p. 565. 
43 Idem, KS, § 22, p. 621. 
44 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 63, pp. 456-457. 
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difference are necessary and unavoidable; on the other hand, solidarity and 
compassion are desirable and pursuable. It is then possible to draft a new 
“recognition political theory” based on this dichotomy. The meaning of recognition 
deals first with the acceptance of the human metaphysical condition; that is, 
finiteness and misery. “A good conscience comes from the fact that unselfish deeds, 
arising out of the immediate recognition of our own essence in other appearances, 
confirm the recognition that our true self does not exist in the single appearance of 
our own person, but in every living thing”45. 
We can accept then the recognition conception as a “transcendental 
condition” in the moral and political sphere, as Axel Honneth sustains in his social 
theory. But with Schopenhauer we learn more: recognition is also the “immanent 
condition”, because of the reflecting logic between the Self and other living beings. 
Thus, Schopenhauer uses the verb wiedererkennen to mean “recognize” the same 
essence into other appearance. It is not simply an Anerkennung, which is literally 
legitimation-through-recognition into a normative paradigm. I would translate and 
understand Schopenhauer’s Wiedererkennen as identifying-once-again the other in 
myself and myself in another. It is very similar to the aesthetical experience 
described by Schopenhauer. As the pure subject of knowledge stands in front of 
and reflects on the eternal shape of the Will (the Idea), so the Ego should 
completely fade away into other, forgetting its individuality: that is, becoming a 
pure subject in front of another pure subject (to paraphrase a well-known 
quotation in The World as Will and Representation).       
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